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Who Monitors the Monitor?
Virtual World Governance and the
Failure of Contract Law Remedies
in Virtual Worlds
Hannah Yee Fen LIMk

ABSTRACT

This Article is a study of the interactionof rules and contractual
terms within the context of fraudulent conduct in virtual worlds. It
makes two main arguments:first, that virtual world providers cannot
generally be trusted to regulate themselves; and second, that
contractualremedies alone do not provide players with useful solutions
to player disputes. The Article highlights the shortcomings of relying
solely on the existing web of contractualdocuments to resolve the issues
and disputes currently experienced in virtual world communities.
Starting with the applicability of real-world laws to virtual worlds,
this Article examines a case study that demonstrates the insufficiency
of contract law in providing remedies for online fraud using the virtual
world EVE Online as an example. While this is a case study of
governance and contract remedy failure in one virtual world, the
arguments and scenariospresented here are applicable to other virtual
worlds because of the homogeneity of terms of service in virtual worlds.
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Virtual worlds offer their residents an interactive and unique
place in which to live and create. 1 Some people spend many of their
waking hours immersed in virtual worlds with some players even
spending up to fifty-five hours at a time either playing or existing in
virtual worlds. 2 Each virtual world has its own aims and objectives.
Some require the player to slay monsters to level up, while others call
for the player to simply exist and experience the virtual world. There
are three main types of virtual worlds. First, there are those that are
simply games where competition and leveling up are the primary
goals. Second, virtual worlds such as Second Life disclaim being
games at all and instead describe themselves as social, threedimensional worlds where one can live, work, and play. Lastly, there
are those hybrid virtual worlds that are a combination of the first two
types where the virtual world not only has a competitive aim but is
also an environment for living and socializing.

1.

Cory Ondrejka, Changing Realities: User Creation, Communication, and

Innovation in Digital Worlds, THEMIS GROUP, 2005, at 4, available at http://www.themisgroup.com/uploads/Changing%20Realities.pdf.
2.
Yee Fen Lim, Is It Really Just a Game? Copyright and Online Role-Playing
Games 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 481, 482 (2006).
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There are multiple sources of rules in virtual worlds, including
real-world laws, the service provider's contractual terms, in-world
rules, and informal virtual world customs that do not amount to rules.
This Article is a study of how some of these rules interact and overlap
in the context of fraudulent conduct in virtual worlds. It adopts legal
scholar Joshua Fairfield's thesis that contracts cannot efficiently or
effectively replace public and private law-such as tort law, property
law, criminal law, and constitutional law-for online communities. 3
This Article highlights the shortcomings of relying solely on the
existing web of contractual documents to resolve the issues and
disputes currently experienced in virtual world communities. Starting
with the applicability of real world laws to virtual worlds, this Article
examines a case study demonstrating the insufficiency of contract law
in providing remedies for online fraud using the virtual world EVE
Online as an example. While this is a case study of contract remedy
failure in one virtual world, the arguments and scenarios presented
here can be extrapolated to other virtual worlds because of the
homogeneity of terms in virtual worlds. 4
For public trust and confidence to be maintained in virtual
worlds, the roles and responsibilities of virtual-world providers need
clarification, especially in the area of online fraud. This Article makes
two main arguments: first, that virtual world providers cannot
generally be trusted to regulate themselves; and second, that
contractual remedies alone do not provide players with useful
solutions to player disputes. The law should not allow virtual world
providers to continue hiding behind contractual terms.

I. THE APPLICATION OF REAL WORLD LAWS TO "GAMES"
Are virtual worlds simply "games" as many virtual world
providers assert? If so, then the players in these virtual worlds are
bound only by the game rules to which they agreed. These "rules" are
paramount, often operating to the exclusion of real-world laws.5 They
are often embodied in documents such as the End User License
Agreements (EULAs), Terms of Service (TOS), or simply set out in
3.
Joshua Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts: The Contractual Governance of Online
Communities, 53 MCGILL L.J. 427 (2008).
4.
Andrew Jankowich, EULAW: The Complex Web of Corporate Rule-Making in
Virtual Worlds, 8 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 49 (2006).
5.
See generally Mia Garlick, Player, Pirate or Conducer? A Considerationof the
Rights of Online Gainers 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1 (2004-2005); Joshua Fairfield, The God
Paradox, 89 B.U.L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (on file with author); Daniel C. Miller, Note,
Determining Ownership in Virtual Worlds: Copyright and Licence Agreements, 22 REV. LIT.
435, 466 (2003).
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lesser documents such as Codes of Conduct and Reimbursement
Policies.
Commentators such as Fairfield have suggested that even if a
virtual world is considered just a game, it does not automatically
follow that the laws of the real world should not apply to it.6 An
illustration from contact sports is illuminating. Within the game of
football, a quarterback cannot complain of battery when he is tackled
if that tackle is within the acceptable bounds of the game.7 However,
if a tackle or any other form of unwanted touching is beyond what is
permitted by the rules of the game, then the player clearly did not
consent to that form of contact, nor assume that particular risk, and
thus, the action may result in tortious liability.8

II. CASE STUDY: FRAUD IN EVE ONLINE
Taking the position that real world laws do apply to virtual
worlds, this Article examines a case study highlighting the
insufficiency of contract law in providing remedies for online fraud.
EVE Online, which has been described as "a science fiction
world of corporate fraud, yankee trading, and piracy,"9 is a virtual
world set in space where the main aim is the player acquisition of
power and treasures. However, there is also an important social
dimension to the virtual world as player interaction is crucial in
activities such as trade, piracy, and acquisitions, thus making EVE
Online a hybrid virtual world. 10 Typically, players pilot spaceships
through a universe of star systems containing moons, planets, and
space stations. 1 EVE Online is both a player-versus-environment and
a player-versus-player virtual world. 12 Like other player-versusplayer environments, deception as a game strategy is a strong part of
the game, and when users enter EVE Online, they agree to play in a
13
world in which deception and fraud are normal occurrences.

6.
Fairfield, supra note 3.
7.
Id. at 18.
8.
Id.
9.
Id. at 49.
10.
EVE Online: Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.eveonline.comfaq
/faq_01.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
11.
EVE Online Backstory, http://www.eve-online.com/background (last visited Apr.
2, 2009).
12.
EVE Online, Guides and News, http://eveonline.rpgstash.com (last visited Apr.
2,
2009);
LinuxLinks
News,
EVE
Online,
http://www.linuxlinks.com/article
/20080608115551709/EVEOnline.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
13.
EVE
Online,
Reimbursement
Policy,
cl.
9,
http://www.eveonline.com/pnp/reimbursment.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2009); see also the
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The usual set up in almost all virtual worlds is that each time a
player logs into the virtual world, but before they are permitted to
access the virtual world, they are presented with some terms and the
player is required to click "I agree" or something similar before being
permitted to proceed into the virtual world. In this regard, EVE
Online is typical. EVE Online requires players to comply with at least
nine documents 14 and interestingly, the clause alerting players that
fraudulent behavior is to be expected in EVE Online is found in a
document called Reimbursement Policy. 15 Since the players have
consented to participate in such an environment, some commentators
claim that these players should not complain when they have been
defrauded in the course of the game, as the conduct is considered part
of the game rather than actionable fraud.16
In early 2006 a player in EVE Online, "Cally," established and
ran a virtual bank, called the EVE Investment Bank (EIB). 17 Other
players invested Inter Stellar Kredits (ISKs), the in-world currency,
with EIB and were promised high interest returns.18 For a while, EIB
delivered these high returns to investors and gained the trust of many
players. 19 It was reported in the press that some players even
deliberately exchanged actual U.S. dollars just to take advantage of
the high returns of this investment scheme. 20 Unbeknownst to many
players, the returns to existing investors were simply paid out of the
capital gained from new investors. Essentially, Cally had constructed
21
a Ponzi scheme within the virtual world.
In August 2006, Cally, who was apparently now operating
under the alias of "Dentara Rast," closed EIB without notice. 22 In a

article on scamming that is embedded in this clause discussing the difference between
scams and exploits.
14.
See EVE Online, Rules & Policies, http://www.eve-online.comlpnp/ (last visited
Mar. 2, 2009), for nine of these documents.
15.
EVE Online, Reimbursement Policy, supra note 13.
16.
See, e.g., Fairfield, supra note 3; Bobby Glushko, Note, Tales of the (Virtual)
City: GoverningPropertyDisputes in Virtual Worlds, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 507 (2007).
17.
Posting of Tudor Stefanescu (Eve Online Economy Suffers 700 billion ISK
Scam) to Softpedia, http://news.softpedia.com/news/Eve-Online-Economy-Suffers-700billion-ISK-Scam-33737.shtml (Aug. 24, 2006, 13:05 GMT).
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
Posting of Julian Murdoch (612 Lawns) to Gainers with Jobs,
http://www.gamerswithjobs.com/node/26703 (Aug. 29, 2006, 9:31 EST).
21.
See Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1924). Cunningham is the seminal
case involving the original Ponzi scheme perpetrated by Charles Ponzi. See id.; see also
Ponzi Schemes, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, http://www.sec.gov/answers
/ponzi.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
22.
Posting of Tudor Stefanescu, supra note 17.
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video confession, Cally gloated about tricking the investors who placed
deposits with EIB. 23 The amount of currency that EIB held at the
time it closed was approximately 790 billion ISKs, although the
creator of EVE Online, Crowd Control Productions (CCP), has
disputed that the amount was this high. 24 Based on this estimate and
the exchange rate at the time, the real-world value of investments
deposited with EIB was very likely between $80,000 and $170,000,
making it one of the highest amounts defrauded in any virtual world
25
to date.
Many interested parties pressed CCP to take action when
Cally's scheme surfaced, but it refused, claiming that Cally's behavior
was within the rules of the virtual world and that it would only
intervene if an "exploit" was used to defraud. 26 An exploit is
essentially a computer-programming bug that can be taken advantage
of to gain unauthorized access to, or to manipulate and subvert the
system. 27 At the time, the company's CEO, Magnus Bergsson, said,
"CCP does not intervene in such cases and will only get involved if a
game exploit was used, which we have not found any indication of in
28
this case."
CCP would not delete Cally's EVE Online account but indicated
that it would monitor the account closely to ensure that the ISKs were
not sold off or converted to real-world currency. 29 However, at the
time, CCP also indicated that it had not found traces of the money,
which might be impossible to locate if Cally had moved it out of EVE

23.
Google Video - Dentara Rast aka Cally Confesses to EIB Scam,
http://video.google.co.uk/videoplay?docid=-1993624284569945666 (last visited Apr. 2,
2009).
24.
Posting of Julian Murdoch, supra note 20 (reporting $700 billion in lost online
currency); Posting of Peter Pollack (Online "Banker"Runs Off with Cash, Avatars Cry Foul)
to Ars Technica, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060828-7605.html (Aug. 28, 2006)
(reporting $790 billion in lost online currency); Posting of Ralphedelominius (CCP Speaks
Out
on
the
EIB
Scam)
to
TenTonHammer.com,
(Sept.
26,
2006),
http://www.tentonhammer.com/node/34217 (quoting CCP press conference which stated
that it did not believe the amount lifted was as high as $790 billon).
25.
Posting of Ralphedelominius, supra note 24. This amount was the biggest scam
to date in any virtual world. Id.
26.
Caroline McCarthy, Cons in the Virtual Gaming World, CNET NEWS, Aug. 31,
2006, http://news.cnet.com/Cons-in-the-virtual-gaming-world/2100-1043_3-6111089.html;
Posting of razor (CCP holds Virtual Conference about EIB Scam) to Razorwire News,
http://razorwire.warcry.com/news/view/64664 (Sept. 11, 2006).
27.
MICHAEL E.WHITMAN & HERBERT J. MATTORD, PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION
SECURITY 28 (2002).

28.
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
29.
Id.; Posting of Charles Husemann (All About The ISK) to Gaming Nexus,
http://www.gamingnexus.comlDefault.aspx?Section=Article&I=1181 (Sept. 2, 2006).
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Online through a series of small transactions or through secondary
30
accounts.
As a result of the EIB scandal, some EVE Online players lost
sizeable amounts of time, effort, and real-world money. It would
appear that those players have essentially been left without recourse
within and outside of the virtual world. Within the virtual world, CCP
argues that the players, when they agreed to play in EVE Online,
consented to the possibility of being tricked and defrauded and they
also willingly invested their money with EIB, but above all, they
assert that Cally did not breach any rules. 31 Under real-world laws, it
appears that the players had consented to playing in EVE Online,
knowing that it was an environment that allows fraud to occur.
Accordingly, the players had consented to a contract whereby they
opened themselves to the possibility of being defrauded. 32 These lines
of argument will be examined in detail below.
While it could be argued that the defrauded players should be
able to have some claim against Cally for misrepresentation and
fraud, the facts surrounding the EIB transactions are sketchy and at
best anecdotal and more solid evidence is required.
The following two parts of this Article examine CCP's response
to the EIB scam: first, it examines CCP's assertion that it would
monitor Cally's account; and second, it analyzes CCP's contention that
Cally did not breach any rules of EVE Online.
III. CCP's RESPONSE I: WHO MONITORS THE MONITOR?
The only assurance that CCP gave to its defrauded players was
that it would "monitor" Cally's account to ensure that Cally did not
33 It
sell or convert the wrongfully gained ISKs to real-world currency.
is unclear what the advantages are of "monitoring," nor is it clear
what other actions CCP had planned to take pursuant to this
"monitoring." But was CCP's assurance that it would monitor Cally's
account an adequate or responsible course of action? Can CCP, or any
virtual world provider for that matter, be trusted to do this? These
issues go to the very heart of virtual world governance. Three points
can be made here.

30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
There is another school of thought beyond the scope of this Article that
contracts agreeing to fraud should be regarded as against public policy because they
provide no cover for the player at all and a paternalistic approach ought to be taken. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981).

33.

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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First, the credibility, integrity, and impartiality of CCP had
already been called into question in an earlier scandal. In February
2007 a CCP employee-who was and still is part of the team writing
the software code for EVE Online and who also played in the gamecheated when he gave the EVE Online corporation his avatar that was
associated with ten very valuable in-game Blueprints Originals worth
billions in ISKs for free. 34 When the employee's cheating was exposed
by another player, "Kugutsumen," CCP terminated all the accounts of
the whistleblower and attempted to cover up the misdeeds of its
employee. 35
Even after the errant employee confessed to his
misconduct on a blog posting, CCP did not reinstate Kugutsumen's
accounts, claiming that he had breached the EULA by increasing the
difficulty or expense of CCP in maintaining EVE Online.36 CCP took
no perceivable actions against its errant employee even though EVE
Online players called for the termination of his employment, or at
least for him to be banned from playing. 37 CCP's response to the
Kugutsumen scandal does not instill much faith in CCP's ability to
handle disputes in an impartial or just manner.
Second, even if CCP wanted to monitor Cally's account, is it
possible for CCP to monitor effectively? CCP admitted that it may be
impossible to monitor if the ISKs are moved out of the virtual world in
many small transactions. 38 Even if CCP had the inclination and
vigilance to monitor, it would still not be possible to stop Cally from
siphoning the money out of EVE Online. In fact, since the events that
occurred in 2006, CCP has made no reports about its investigations.
It is unknown whether CCP actually traced the ISKs or whether it
took any actions against Cally. There were calls for Cally to be
prosecuted for fraud, 39 but there have been no reports of Cally's realworld fate.
34.

Joe Blancato, Jumpgate: EVE's Devs and the Friends They Keep, ESCAPIST
Feb. 9, 2007, available at http://www.escapistmagazine.com/articles/view
/editorials/op-ed/847-Jumpgate-EVE-s-Devs-and-the-Friends-They-Keep.
Blueprints are
required within EVE Online to manufacture items. See EVE Online, Reimbursement
Policy, supra note 13, at cl. 11. The functions of Blueprints are not important for the
analysis here. The important point is that Blueprints are extremely valuable and they were
not supposed to be given away for free, like they were here. See id. The action of the
employee is akin to a player in the board game Monopoly secretly being given $1 million
more than all the other players. Id.
35.
Blancato, supra note 34.
36.
Id.
37.
Posting of Luke Plunkett (Scandal Hits Eve Online) to Kotaku,
http://kotaku.com/gaming/eve-online/scandal-hits-eve-online-234863.php
(Feb. 8, 2007)
(quoting player Borgholio).
38.
See Posting of Charles Husemann, supra note 29.
39.
See Posting of Julian Murdoch, supra note 20.
MAG.,
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The more appropriate course of action would have been for
CCP to freeze Cally's account and his avatar's assets, including the
deposits in EIB. Ultimately, it needs to be assessed whether or not
CCP can effectively monitor Cally's account. Although CCP claims
monitoring is difficult, CCP-like many other virtual world
providers-keeps server logs and other databases of collected
information. 40 Since these logs capture every transaction, it is difficult
to believe CPP's claim of difficulty in monitoring small transactions in
Cally's account. It seems that CCP would have all the requisite
information, and that the issue is really one of an allocation of
resources to manually sift through the logs to trace the ISKs.
Third, it is in the best interests of CCP to take the passive
approach and do nothing, since this is the most financially efficient
position. As mentioned above, careful monitoring of transaction logs
would require lots of staff time and energy. Additionally, CCP may
have already made a financial gain that it would not want to reverse.
The mechanism by which this could have occurred is quite simple. It
is suspected that some players had deliberately converted real-world
money into ISKs to invest in EIB. 41 Like many other virtual world
providers, CCP prohibits the conversion of in-game currency into realworld money and vice versa, 42 but this does not mean the conversions
do not occur. Certainly at the time of the Cally scandal, it was
possible to exchange, albeit indirectly, real-world money into ISKs and
vice versa without breaching the rules, through the in-game buying
and selling of Game Time Codes (GTCs). 43 GTCs are one-time use
codes that give players subscription time to a virtual world, an
44
alternative to the normal subscription method of cyclical billing.
CCP allows players to buy EVE Online GTCs with ISKs; therefore,
players who could not afford to pay for subscriptions with real money
could instead use ISKs that they earned in-game to buy game time
from other players who did not wish to spend much time generating
their own ISKs. 45 In this way, a player whose avatar needs ISKs

40.
See, e.g., EVE Online, Reimbursement Policy, supra note 13, at cl. 11.
41.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
42.
EVE Online Support, Reporting ISK Spammers, http://support.eveonline.com/Pages/KB/Article.aspx?id=436 (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
43.
EVE Online, EVE Time Code Retailers, https://secure.eve-online.comletc.aspx
(lastvisited Apr. 2, 2009).
44.
EVE Online, http://www.eve-online.com/ (lastvisited Apr. 2, 2009).
45.
See EVE Online Forum, Guide to Selling, Buying, and Using Game Time Codes,
http://myeve.eve-online.com/ingameboard.asp?a=topic&threadID=596886 (last visited Apr.
2, 2009) (noting that "[pllayers have the option of purchasing a game time code (GTC,
PLEX) from others thus paying for their EVE subscription entirely with ISK).
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immediately can "buy" ISKs by buying GTCs for real money and then
selling them to other players for ISKs.
The net result is that real-world money has passed to CCP
through the conversion of real-world money into ISKs. CCP naturally
wants the ISKs to remain ISKs so that it can keep holding on to the
real-world money to use as it pleases. If CCP were to investigate and
monitor transactions, CCP may be obligated to return the ISKs to the
players, who might decide to "cash out" the ISKs, and may thereby
result in CCP having to return the real-world money. With all of
these incentives in place, one might wonder whether Cally could have
been an avatar created and operated by CCP or in some other way
associated with CCP. Ultimately, the whole EIB scam could have
been an easy way for the company to raise capital.
This section has canvassed three primary problems associated
with relying on CCP, a virtual world provider, to regulate itself and
ensure that its virtual world is operated and governed fairly and
impartially. Indeed, self-regulation is rarely ever the most effective
way of ensuring justice.
IV. CCP's RESPONSE II: "No RULES WERE BREACHED"

In any virtual world, a player's conduct is governed by
numerous formal agreements, as well as informal etiquette and online
norms. EVE Online is typical in this regard, providing players with at
least nine documents with which they must comply. 46 Much has been
written on the topic of online contracts, but the literature on consent
in contracting has traditionally focused on a party's comprehension of
the terms of the contract or the presence or absence of true consent in
standard form contracts. 47 Many scholars have considered, for
example, the capacity of minors to contract and whether young
teenagers playing virtual world games truly understand and
adequately consent to the terms of an EULA or a TOS when they click
on "I agree." 48 This Article acknowledges that there are genuine
issues regarding the legality of the consent, but it makes the
argument that even if a person truly comprehends and assents to and
can be legally bound by the terms of an online contract, one must still
look more closely at the exact nature of the terms a player has
consented to. In EVE Online, as in many virtual worlds, all the rules
46.
See EVE Online, Rules & Policies, http://www.eve-online.compnp/ (last visted
Apr. 23, 2009) (displaying nine of these documents).
47.
See Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75
IND. L.J. 1125, 1126-28 (2000).
48.
Id.; see also Fairfield, supra note 3, at 439.
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and norms-some of which form part of the contractual terms-must
be read together. One of the bases upon which CCP justified its nonaction against Cally was that Cally did not breach any "rule" of the
game. This sweeping statement will be analyzed in Part V to
determine whether CCP's position is defensible.
Commentators like Fairfield have taken the approach that as
players enter and participate in virtual worlds, they are aware of and
consent to fraud and deception as part of the virtual world:
Thus, as often happens in game, when one person gains the trust of another, only
to betray that trust and "steal" virtual assets, this is considered part of the game
rather than actionable fraud or theft. Obviously, the theft of these assets is not
actionable within the EVE world, since
being defrauded (like being bluffed in a
49
poker game) is part of the game itself.

While it may be true that fraud and deception are part of EVE Online,
it does not necessarily follow that all forms of fraud and deception are
acceptable and tolerated within the rules of the game and the
contractual terms of use.
There are two clear contractual
relationships that exist in the Cally-CCP debacle, and each will be
considered below in Parts V and VI: (1) between CCP and Cally, and
(2) between a defrauded player and CCP.
V. CONTRACT BETWEEN CCP AND CALLY:
CCP's FAILURE TO CORRECTLY INTERPRET RULES

Relying largely on the reasoning that fraud and deception are
part of EVE Online, CCP asserted that Cally did not breach any rules.
However, the contract between CCP and the players of EVE Online
shows otherwise.
EVE Online's TOS clearly states that players must abide by the
TOS and the EULA. The preamble to the TOS states:
As an Eve Online subscriber, you must observe and abide by the rules of conduct
and policies outlined below, as well as the End User License Agreement. Failure to
comply with these regulations can result in the immediate termination of your
account and you will forfeit all unused access time to the game. No refunds will be

given.

5o

Importantly, Clause 9 of the TOS states:
You may not advertise, employ, market, or promote any form of
solicitation-including pyramid schemes and chain letters--in the Eve Online
51
game world or on the website.

49.

Fairfield, supra note 3, at 460-61.

50.

EVE

Online,

Rules

&

Policies:

online.com/pnp/terms.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).

51.

Id.

Terms

of

Service,

http://www.eve-
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As already mentioned, the scam perpetrated by Cally was
essentially a Ponzi scheme. A Ponzi scheme works on the "rob Peter
to pay Paul" principle, whereby the perpetrator uses money from new
investors to pay off the earlier ones until there are no more new
investors and the whole scheme collapses. The collapse may occur
when regulators discover it, or in the case of Cally's scheme, until the
The U.S. Securities and
perpetrator disappears with the loot.
Exchange Commission (SEC) regards a Ponzi scheme as a type of
pyramid scheme. 52 A number of legal scholars also share the view
that a Ponzi scheme is a form of a pyramid scheme.5 3 The only
difference between a pyramid scheme and a Ponzi scheme is that most
pyramid schemes reward participants who bring new investors into
the scheme. However, the schemes share two primary characteristics:
first, there is no real product; and second, the money paid out to
investors comes not from value created by the business, but directly
from the pockets of new investors.
Clause 9 of EVE Online's TOS clearly forbids the
advertisement, employment, marketing, or promotion of any form of
pyramid scheme, which would include Cally's Ponzi scheme.5 4 As
such, Cally's conduct falls within the prohibitions listed in this clause,
and thus Cally did break the rules, despite CCP's assertions to the
contrary. CCP incorrectly interpreted or applied the contractual
clauses. Unfortunately for an EVE Online player defrauded by Cally,
establishing a breach of the TOS agreement may be of little use in
According to the
obtaining any remedies under contract law.
preamble of EVE Online's TOS, the best that a defrauded player can
expect under Cally's contract with CCP is for CCP to terminate Cally's
account.5 5 There is no provision under the contract for CCP to
compensate the defrauded players for Cally's breach.

52.
See Ponzi Schemes, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 21.
53.
See, e.g., Todd M. Hinnen, The Cyber-Front in the War on Terrorism: Curbing
Terrorist Use of the Internet, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 5 (2003/2004); David F.
Kurzawa II, When Fair Consideration Is Not Fair, 11 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 461
(2002); Christopher R. Leslie, Den of Inequity: The Case for Equitable Doctrines in Rule
10b-5 Cases, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1587 (1993); Mark A. McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the
Law of Fraudulent and Preferential Transfers, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 157 (1998); Todd M.
Tippett, Game When They Win; Investment When They Lose: SEC v. SG, Ltd., 7 COMP. L.
REV. & TECH. J. 313 (2003); Darlene S. Wood, Casenote: Lease-back Arrangements are
Investment Contracts and Therefore Securities Under the Securities Acts: SEC v. Edwards,
7 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 135 (2005).
54.
See EVE Online, Rules & Policies: Terms of Service, supra note 50.
55.
Id.
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VI. CONTRACT BETWEEN CCP AND A DEFRAUDED PLAYER:
CCP's FAILURE TO CORRECTLY INTERPRET RULES
AND THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF CONTRACTUAL REMEDIES

Many scholars have commented that EVE Online players
accept fraud and deception as part of the online gaming environment
and that they should not be permitted to complain when they are
defrauded by schemes like Cally's EIB.56 However, this Article refutes
that position and proposes that the defrauded players did not in fact
consent to Cally's fraud when they played EVE Online.
When determining what conduct or playing environment
players have consented to upon entering a virtual world, it is essential
that the whole agreement between a player and the virtual world
provider be read in its entirety. Only then can one determine
precisely the type of fraud to which a player has consented. While
EVE Online players may have consented to some level of in-game
fraud and deception, there may be limits on the type and scale of
permissible fraud to which a player has agreed.
A. Nature of Consent
First, assuming that EVE Online players read the TOS, they
likely understand that it forbids the advertisement, employment,
marketing, or promotion of any form of pyramid scheme. Having
established above that Cally's EIB scheme was prohibited by Clause 9
of the TOS, most players would not expect such a scheme to operate or
exist in EVE Online, and therefore would not have consented to being
defrauded by a Ponzi scheme simply by playing the game.
The second aspect of consent is the user's "scale" or "level" of
consent. EVE Online is described by its developers as a
massive multiplayer online [role-playing] game (MMORPG) set in a science-fiction
based, persistent world. Players take the role of spaceship pilots seeking fame,
fortune, and adventure in a huge, complex, exciting, and sometimes hostile
57
galaxy.

56.
See, e.g., Farnaz Alemi, An Avatar's Day in Court: A Proposal for Obtaining
Relief and Resolving Disputes in Virtual World Games, UCLA J.L. & TECH. 6 (2007);
Fairfield, supra note 3; Bobby Glushko, A Note: Tales of the (Virtual) City: Governing
Property Disputes In Virtual Worlds, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 507 (2007); Jason T. Kunze,
Regulating Virtual Realms Optimally: The Model End User License Agreement, 7 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 102 (2008); Ethan E. White, Massively Multiplayer Online Fraud:
Why the Introductionof Real World Law in a Virtual Context Is Good for Everyone, 6 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 228 (2008).
57.
EVE Online: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 10.
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This description is in stark contrast to other virtual worlds
such as Second Life where the developer, Linden Lab, has claimed
that it is not a game. 58 According to its website, Second Life has a
"fully integrated economy architected to reward risk, innovation and
craftsmanship." 59 It also advises that businesses succeed in Second
Life by the "ingenuity, artistic ability, entrepreneurial acumen, and
good reputation of their owners." 60 The difference in the classification
of these two virtual worlds is significant. EVE Online, because it is
classified as a "game," leads players to regard it first and foremost as
such, whereas Second Life's clear assertions that it is not a game
sends the message that playing is more akin to interacting in the real
world. Certainly, Second Life players like Marc Bragg, 61 as well as
Ailin Graef, whose avatar, Anshe Chung, was the first online avatar to
achieve a net worth exceeding one million U.S. dollars from profits
earned entirely inside a virtual world, 62 are fully aware of the business
and economic opportunities in Second Life and are prepared to accept
the inherent risks. Whether a virtual world is advertised as a "game"
influences players' perception of it, and consequently informs us
whether players have consented to certain types of actions and risks
in that world.
The stakes are naturally much higher in a virtual world like
Second Life than in a virtual world like EVE Online. When a player
enters a virtual world thinking it is a mere game, the level or scale of
fraud to which he or she consents is probably much lower than when
that player enters a virtual world that promotes itself as being akin to
the real world. As such, a player would not expect to be exposed to the
same kind of risk of fraud in a virtual world that is promoted as an
alternative to the real world. Although it is unknown how much
money the average player invested with EIB in EVE Online, given the
large sum that was reportedly lost in the scam, 63 it is unlikely that the
level of fraud was consistent with players' expectations and
perceptions and therefore did not occur with their consent. Thus, it is
unlikely that players consent to being victims of all kinds of fraud and
deception occurring within virtual worlds.

Kenneth James, Real Benefits in Virtual Worlds, Bus. TIMES (Singapore), Dec.
58.
11, 2006.
Second Life: The Marketplace, https://secure-web6.secondlife.comlwhatis
59.
/marketplace.php (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
60.
Id.
Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc, 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
61.
Rob Hof, Second Life's First Millionaire,Bus. WEEK, Nov. 26, 2006, availableat
62.
http://www.businessweek.com/thethread/techbeat/archives/2006/1 1/secondlifesfi.html.
63.
See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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B. ContractualRemedies under a Defrauded Player's
Contract with CCP
Given that players arguably did not consent to being defrauded
by a Ponzi scheme such as the EIB scheme, the next issue to consider
is whether remedies are available to a defrauded player under her
own contract with CCP. Relying solely on the contract between Cally
and CCP would likely not result in any effective and meaningful
solution, 64 since under EVE Online's TOS, Cally's breach of Clause 9
would at worst result in the termination of Cally's avatar. 65 This
remedy, however, remains within the complete discretion of CCP.
To examine what remedies could be awarded to a player under
her own contract with CCP for being the victim of a Ponzi scheme in
Eve Online, two possible implied terms could be considered. First, a
defrauded EVE Online player would likely argue that it was an
implied term of the contract that she would not be exposed to any
pyramid or Ponzi schemes. Second, a player could argue that there
was an implied term that CCP would enforce its contract with respect
to other online players. But does the player have a contractual
remedy against CCP for breach of these two implied terms, if they are
held to exist?
1. Remedy for Breaching Implied Term Regarding Pyramid Schemes
The role of remedies in contract law is to put the injured party
in the same position that she would be in if the contract with the
breaching party had been performed. This can normally be achieved
by awarding monetary damages or specific performance of the
contract. 66 Monetary damages are usually intended to compensate the
injured party for the loss of the bargain.
Under U.S. law, consequential damages can be awarded for
foreseeable damages arising from circumstances outside of the
contract, but only if the breaching party knows or ought to have
known that the breach would cause special damage to the other
party. 67 Consequential damages would be applicable in this case
because CCP would have known that if there was a Ponzi scheme

64.
See also Fairfield, supra note 3; Radin, supra note 47.
65.
See EVE Online, Rules & Policies: Terms of Service, supra note 50, at
Preamble.
66.
See Steven Shavell, Specific Performance Versus Damages for Breach of
Contract (Harvard Law and Economics Discussion, Paper No. 532), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=868593.
67.
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 347, 351 (1981).

1068

VANDERBILT J OF ENT AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 11:4:1053

operating in EVE Online, it was reasonably foreseeable that players
would lose their ISKs. Hence, for the implied term that there would
not be any Ponzi schemes within Eve Online, it was conceivable that a
breach of such a term would result in players being defrauded through
such a scheme and thus it would appear that players would be entitled
However, there are numerous
to claim consequential damages.
of
Use of the Eve Online Website
Terms
the
clauses in the EULA and
(Terms of Use) designed to limit CCP's liability for this type of breach.
Clause 12 of the Eve Online EULA provides:
NO WARRANTIES
The Software, System, Game and all Game Content, and all other services and
material provided in connection therewith, are provided "AS IS," with all faults,
and without warranty of any kind. You assume all risk of use and all risk
associated with accessing the System and playing the Game.
CCP disclaims all warranties, whether express or implied, including without
limitation the warranties of merchantability, fitness for particular purpose and
non-infringement. There is no warranty against interference with your enjoyment
of the Game... 68

Clause 12 essentially states that players assume all risk of use of the
game and that this risk is not limited to just the system but to all
game content as well, which would likely include another player's
creation of a Ponzi scheme within the game. Clause 12 further
Whether this
disclaims all warranties, express and implied.6 9
prohibition in
the
term
in
implied
to
the
extend
disclaimer would
Clause 9 of the TOS is a question of contractual construction and
interpretation and may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In some
jurisdictions, legislation has prohibited the exclusion of some forms of
70
warranties from contracts.
On the issue of damages, Clause 13 of the EULA is very similar
to Clause 8 of the Terms of Use, which is a document that applies to
the entire website including the virtual world itself, the forums, and
Between the two clauses, CCP disclaims all
the chat rooms.
conceivable liability for damages. Clause 13 reads:

EVE Online, Rules & Policies: End User License Agreement, http://www.eve68.
online.com/pnp/eula.asp (last visited Apr. 23, 2009).
Id.
69.
See, e.g., California Food and Agriculture Code § 12854. The most notable of
70.
these would include those concerning health, safety, and foodstuff. For example, under the
CaliforniaFood and Agriculture Code (FAC), Section 12854 provides that no limitations of
warranty by the seller shall exclude or waive the implied warranty that the pesticide is
reasonably fit for use for any purpose for which it is intended according to any printed
statement of the registrant. Id.
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DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES
In no event shall CCP, its affiliates, licensors or suppliers be liable to you or to any
third party for any special, indirect, incidental, consequential, punitive or
exemplary damages (including without limitation, lost profits or lost data), arising
out of or in connection with your Account, the System, Software, Game, Game
Content, User Content, EULA, or any other services or materials provided in
connection therewith, whether based on warranty, contract, tort or any other legal
theory, and whether or not CCP is advised of the possibility
of such damages, and
71
even if any stated remedy fails of its essential purpose.

Like the EULAs of many other virtual worlds, this disclaimer
of damages clause is extremely broad. It declares that in "no event"
will CCP be liable for any damages to the player or to any third party,
including without limitation consequential damages arising out of or
in connection with EVE Online; this also includes the game content
and user content, like Cally's Ponzi scheme. 72 The clause even covers
damages arising out of contract, tort, or any other legal theory,
73
whether or not CCP is advised of the possibility of such damages.
Clause 8 of the Terms of Use reads more like an exclusion
clause from an insurance contract in that it refers to war, flood, and
riots. 74 However, Clause 8 goes further than Clause 13 of the EULA
by specifically disclaiming any liability for any act or omission of any
75
third party. This would encompass the acts of players such as Cally.
Any claim by a defrauded player for consequential damages would
likely be defeated by these two clauses.

71.
EVE Online, Rules & Policies: End User License Agreement, supra note 68.
72.
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
EVE
Online,
Website
Terms
of
Use,
http://www.eveonline.comlpnp/termsofuse.asp (last visited Apr. 23, 2009). Clause 8 (Limitation of
Liability) reads:
In no event will CCP, or any of its affiliates or subsidiaries, be liable for any
damages, including without limitation, direct or indirect, special, incidental, or
consequential dmages [sic], losses or expenses, including, but not limited to, lost
profits, disclosure, disclosure of confidential information, loss of privacy and loss
of use, arsising [sic] in connection with this site or use thereof or inability to use
by any party, or inconnection [sic] with any failure of performance, error,
omission, interruption, defect, delay in operation or transmission, computer virus
or system failure, even if CCP, HF, of affiliates thereof, are advised of the
possibility of such damages, losses or expenses. In addition, in no event will CCP,
HF be liable for any act or omission of any third party including, but not limited
to, any provider of telecommunications services, internet access or computer
equipment or software or for any circumstances beyond its control including, but
not limited to, fire, flood or other natural disaster, war, riot, strike, act of civil or
military authority, equipment failure, computer virus, or failure or interruption
of electrical, telecommunications or other utility services.
Id. at cl. 8.
75.
Id.
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2. Remedy for the Implied Term That CCP Will Enforce
the Terms of its Contract with Other Players
For breach of the implied term that CCP will enforce the terms
of its EULA against other players, the available remedy for a
defrauded player against CCP would likely not amount to anything
substantial. As noted above, if a player such as Cally breaches the
TOS, CCP has discretion to punish him by terminating his accounts
and confiscating his in-game assets.7 6 Even if a player attempts to
bring an action against CCP for breach of such an implied term, CCP
could argue that it has discretion to punish the breaching player as it
wishes. Most importantly, this course of action would not result in
any damages for the defrauded player.
3. Overarching Contractual Terms and Issues
There are a number of clauses and overarching issues that
relate to contractual remedies for EVE Online players in general.
First, Clause 14 of the EULA provides that CCP's maximum liability
for any and all claims shall not exceed an amount equal to the value of
one month's subscription fee unless there has been a material breach
of CCP's obligations to provide access to and use of the virtual world,
in which case the liability is no greater than an amount equal to the
value of three months' subscription fees. 77 Clause 14 further provides:
If any of the foregoing disclaimers or limitations of liability are declared to be void

or unenforceable, then CCP's liability shall be limited to the maximum extent
permissible under applicable law. The remedies set forth herein78 are exclusive and
in lieu of all other remedies, oral or written, express, or implied.

76.

See EVE Online, Rules & Policies: Terms of Service, supra note 50.

77.

See EVE Online, Rules & Policies: End User License Agreement, supra note 68.

Clause 14 (Limitation of Liability) reads:
Except as set forth below, CCP's maximum liability for any and all claims arising
out of or in connection with your Account, the Software, System, Game, Game
Content, User Content, EULA, and any other services or materials provided in
connection therewith, shall not exceed an amount equal to the value of one (1)
month's subscription fees. In the event of a material breach of CCP's obligations
to provide access to and use of your Account, the System, Game, Game Content
or User Content, your sole and exclusive remedy shall be a refund of any prepaid subscription fees attributable to the period during which you were denied
such access and use, or an amount equal to the value of three (3) months'
subscription fees, whichever is less. In the event of a malfunction of or your
inability to use the CD-ROM containing the Software, your sole and exclusive
remedy shall be a replacement disk from the vendor that provided the CD-ROM
in accordance with its replacement policy; CCP shall have no liability for the CDROM ....
Id. at cl. 14.
Id.
78.
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Thus the effect of Clause 14 is that the most any defrauded
player could claim in damages is the equivalent of one month's
subscription fees, unless the disclaimers or limitations of liability were
declared to be void or unenforceable, in which case CCP should be
liable "to the maximum extent permissible under applicable law." 79
This raises the issue of contracts of adhesion, which may be
unconscionable.
The U.S. district court case of Bragg v. Linden
examined the contract provisions of Second Life's EULA, s0 and
concluded that clauses regarding arbitration and forum selection were
unconscionable and unenforceable.8 1
Bragg involved a domestic
dispute where all the parties were domiciled in the United States.
Both parties agreed to the court's application of California law in its
analysis of the contract, even though the court eventually found void
the clause requiring a California venue for arbitration.8 2 Indeed, the
court relied on precedent which states that it is "not reasonable for
individual consumers from throughout the country to travel to one
locale to arbitrate claims involving such minimal sums." 8 3
CCP is an Icelandic corporation headquartered in Iceland, but
it has a U.S. office in Georgia.8 4 Clause 16 of the EVE Online EULA
stipulates that the contract shall be governed and construed by and in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of Iceland.8 5 It further
excludes the applicability of the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.86 Any disputes or
claims against CCP must be heard in the District Court of Reykjavik,
79.
Id.
80.
Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc, 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
81.
Id. at 605-06, 611.
82.
Id. at 603-604, 610.
83.
Id. at 610.
84.
CCP, Company Contact Information, http://www.ccpgames.com/company
/contact.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
85.
EVE Online, Rules & Policies: End User License Agreement, supra note 68.
Clause 16 (Governing Law & Exclusive Forum) reads:
The EULA [End User License Agreement], and the rights and obligations of the
parties hereto, shall be governed and construed by and in accordance with the
laws of the Republic of Iceland. The EULA shall not be governed by the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. The sole
and exclusive forum for resolving any controversy, dispute or claim arising out of
or relating to the EULA, or otherwise relating to any rights in, access to or use of
the Software, System, Game, Game Content, User Content and/or the rights and
obligations of the parties hereto, shall be the District Court of Reykjavik,
Iceland, (H~rabsd6mur Reykjavikur). You hereby expressly waive and agree not
to raise any and all objections based on personal jurisdiction, venue and/or
inconvenience of such forum and agree to the jurisdiction of the District Court of
Reykjavik, Iceland.
Id. at cl. 16.
86.
Id.
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Iceland, and players are deemed to have expressly waived all
objections based on personal jurisdiction, venue, and/or inconvenience
87
of such forum.
It is outside the scope of this Article to examine Icelandic
contract law concerning unconscionable contracts, or to delve into
conflict of law issues. But this much is clear: while the venue could be
challenged similarly to the argument in Bragg, the contract's choice of
law provision would likely not be disturbed even if a claim were
brought in a U.S. court.88
Relying on contractual remedies in international situations is
complicated. First, the costs of litigating in a foreign country would be
high, and it would be a difficult and costly fight to argue for the
dispute to be heard in the United States. Second, even if the case
were moved to the U.S., one would have to maneuver skillfully around
Icelandic law, which creates the added difficulty of interpreting a
foreign language and its precedents. Third, assuming a mastery of
Icelandic law, one would need to successfully argue that the
disclaimers or limitations of liability are void or unenforceable. Only
then could a party be truly compensated, otherwise a defrauded player
would have to be satisfied with the somewhat measly compensation of
the cost of one month's subscription fee to EVE Online.
VII. CONCLUSION
The foregoing sections have demonstrated that purely
contractual remedies may not be entirely helpful to the defrauded
player. When the matter is considered as a whole, logic and common
sense suggest that CCP as the virtual world provider should be doing
more in response to Cally's fraud. After all, in Clause 15 of the EULA,
each player is required to indemnify CCP from any and all claims and
demands arising out of any activities conducted though the player's
EVE Online account.8 9 If the defrauded players had taken legal action
87.
88.

Id.
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS: CHOICE OF LAW
CLAUSES § 187 (1988) ("Choice-of-law provisions contained in such [adhesion] contracts are
usually respected.").
EVE Online, Rules & Policies: End User License Agreement, supra note 68, at
89.
cl. 15. Clause 15 states that
You shall defend, indemnify and hold harmless CCP and its affiliates, licensors
and suppliers, and their respective employees, contractors, officers and directors,
from any and all claims, loss, damages and demands, including reasonable
attorneys' fees, arising out of: (i) your use or misuse of the Software; (ii) your
access to the System; (iii) any activities conducted through your Account
(whether by you or another person); and (iv) your playing of the Game.
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against CCP, then CCP could have exercised this indemnity clause
against Cally. Alternatively, CCP, being the "game god," 90 could have
easily frozen Cally's virtual assets and resolved the matter with the
defrauded players by redistributing the ISKs back among them.
However, CCP took neither of these actions. Instead, when the
swindle surfaced, CCP stood idle and insisted that Cally had not
breached any rules of the virtual world. Not only were CCP's
interpretations and application of the rules in the TOS to Cally's
conduct erroneous, but they also misconceived the nature and extent
of the consent to fraud on the part of the players. In short, CCP's
actions demonstrate that there are serious concerns regarding the
efficacy of a virtual world provider regulating itself.
While EVE Online represents an extreme case because of the
magnitude of the fraud, fraud is quite common in virtual worlds. 91
Additionally, the problem of homogeneity of terms in virtual worlds
means that contractual remedies are unlikely to adequately
compensate victims of fraud in most virtual worlds. Since virtual
world providers supply and facilitate the framework for fraud to occur,
they ought to ensure that the virtual world is operated and governed
fairly and impartially. Problems arise for players when there is poor
governance of virtual worlds such as when the providers ignore the
actions of their players that are in breach of the rules. Many of the
virtual world providers today still subscribe to the "game god"
mentality92 and it is precisely for this reason that they cannot
generally be trusted to regulate themselves. The law should step in
and stop allowing virtual world providers to continue to hide behind
contractual terms.

90.
Joshua Fairfield, The God Paradox, 89 B.U.L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (on file
with author).
91.
See supra text and accompanying notes 16, 50.
92.
See supra note 90.

